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REINING IN THE NOERR-PENNINGTON
AND STATE ACTION DOCTRINES
Karen Roche*
This Article focuses on two limits to federal antitrust law—the NoerrPennington and state action doctrines. These doctrines aim to balance
the right to petition and the independent sovereignty of the states with
the goals of antitrust law. Therefore, these doctrines protect petitioning
and state action from liability, even where such action is
anticompetitive in nature or motive and thwarts the goals of the
antitrust laws. While it seems clear that these two exceptions to federal
antitrust law are rooted in the First Amendment and federalism, the
Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the sources or extent of the
doctrines. Because of this, the doctrines are far broader than is
necessary to give deference to these principles. This Article examines
the harm that these overly broad exceptions cause consumers and
proposes that the Court narrow the doctrines by tailoring them to what
is required by the First Amendment and federalism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1890, in reaction to the public outrage at nineteenth century
economic giants, Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act (the
“Sherman Act” or the “Act”) in an effort to curb the unethical
political and economic forces behind monopolies.1 The Act prohibits
any trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce and makes it
a felony to monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of
interstate trade or commerce.2 The purpose of the Act was, and still
is, to promote competition for the benefit of the consumer.3 Because
competitive prices and quality resources protect the consumer,
antitrust laws restrict conduct that harms efficiency by raising prices
above—or driving quality or output below—the competitive level.4
Since 1890, the enforcement of antitrust laws and the laws
themselves have changed with the economic, political, and social
climate.5 While protecting the consumer remains the goal of the
antitrust laws, the structures used to achieve this end have varied.6
These laws have been viewed both narrowly and expansively to
match the climate of the era.7 But, however one views substantive
1. Robert P. Faulkner, The Foundations of Noerr-Pennington and the Burden of Proving
Sham Petitioning: The Historical-Constitutional Argument in Favor of a “Clear and
Convincing” Standard, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 681, 696 (1994).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (The Sherman
Act “directs itself . . . against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition . . . out of
concern for the public interest.”); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988
(9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the “central purpose” of the antitrust laws is to preserve competition
in order to benefit consumers); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir.
2007) (“The primary goal of antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare by promoting
competition among firms.”); Assoc. of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris Inc., 79 F. Supp.
2d 1219, 1223 (W.D. Wash. 1999), aff’d, 241 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Antitrust laws are only
intended to preserve competition for the benefit of consumers.”).
4. Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001).
5. See 1 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 1.01, at 1-1 to 1-2 (2d ed. 2011).
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also Diana De Leon, The Judicial Contraction of Section 2 Doctrine, 45 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1105 (2012) (arguing that two recent Supreme Court cases have narrowed the scope
of liability for Section 2 monopoly violations involving unilateral firm conduct, to the detriment
of competition and consumers); Allen G. Haroutounian, Shedding Light on the Federal Courts'
Treatment of Horizontal Restraints Under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 45 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1173 (2012) (discussing how the court has moved from the per se approach to the rule of
reason approach when analyzing horizontal restraints); Nicole McGuire, An Antitrust Narcotic:
How the Rule of Reason Is Lulling Vertical Enforcement to Sleep, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1225
(2012) (focusing on how the rule of reason has overtaken the per se standard as the only analysis
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antitrust law, there are certain areas in which antitrust law does not
apply.8 Both the judiciary and the legislature have recognized these
areas, which create exceptions to the general consumer-protection
policy of antitrust law.9 These exceptions aim to give deference to
competing policies that conflict with antitrust laws.10 This Article
focuses on two such limits—the Noerr-Pennington11 and state action
doctrines. Respectively, these doctrines shield citizen petitioning and
state action from the reach of antitrust law.12 The U.S. Constitution
and the structure of the federal government protect the independent
sovereignty of the states13 and the right of all citizens to petition the
government.14 The Noerr-Pennington and state action doctrines aim
to balance these core principles with the goals of antitrust law.15
Therefore, under these doctrines, petitioning and state action will not
give rise to liability, even where such action is anticompetitive in
nature or motive16 and thwarts the goals of antitrust law.17

in vertical restraint cases and arguing that the rule of reason operates as a default rule of per se
legality); Marleina Paz, Almost But Not Quite Perfect: The Past, Present, and Potential Future of
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1045 (2012) (arguing that the Obama
Administration has appropriately been more aggressive in challenging horizontal mergers than the
Bush administration).
8. 3 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 5, § 47.01, at 47-1.
9. Id. at 47-7 to 47-9.
10. Id.
11. The doctrine takes its name from the two cases that created it: Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). This Article will use the terms NoerrPennington and Noerr to refer to the doctrine .
12. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
13. The Constitution reflects the balance between state and federal sovereignty. The
Supremacy clause makes the laws of the United States the supreme law of the land, U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2, while the Tenth Amendment dictates that powers not delegated to the federal
government are reserved to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
15. As a constitutional guarantee, the right to petition deserves deference from all other laws
and policies. Although “[a]s a charter of freedom, the Sherman Act has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions[,]” the Sherman
Act is “perhaps unfortunately” not a constitutional provision. Faulkner, supra note 1, at 689 &
n.62 (citing Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933)).
16. Black’s Law Dictionary defines anticompetitive conduct as “[a]n act that harms or seeks
to harm the market or the process of competition among businesses, and that has no legitimate
business purpose.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (9th ed. 2009); see also Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (defining anticompetitive conduct
“generally . . . as conduct to obtain or maintain monopoly power as a result of competition on
some basis other than the merits. Conduct that impairs the opportunities of rivals and either does
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While it seems clear that these two exceptions to federal
antitrust law are rooted in the First Amendment and federalism, the
Supreme Court has failed to clearly delineate the precise sources or
extent of the doctrines.18 This failure has left the lower courts
without a clear standard to apply in cases where these protected
rights conflict with antitrust law.19 When the Supreme Court carved
out these exceptions to antitrust liability, it relied on the Sherman Act
as the source of the immunities.20 The Court held that it was
excluding from antitrust liability activities that it found to be beyond
the intended scope of antitrust laws. In doing so, the Court read the
Sherman Act in a way that altogether avoided the conflict between
antitrust law on one hand and the First Amendment and federalism
on the other.21 For example, in Noerr, the Court held that a petition
to the government was not the type of agreement in restraint of trade
that the Sherman Act was meant to prevent.22 The Court explained
that the Sherman Act is meant to regulate business activity, not
political activity.23 Similarly, in Parker, the case that created the
state action doctrine,24 the Court held that there was nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act that was intended to prohibit a state
from exercising its own regulatory authority.25 Although the Court
ultimately found that the Sherman Act simply did not apply in these
contexts, the decisions themselves and later opinions indicate that the
Noerr and Parker holdings were influenced by the Court’s concern

not further competition on the merits, or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way may be
deemed anticompetitive”).
17. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136; Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
18. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
19. See infra Part III.
20. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136–37; Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51.
21. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137; Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
22. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136–37.
23. Id. at 137 (explaining that imposing liability on those petitioning the government “would
impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a
purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act”).
24. Parker, 317 U.S. at 341. While Parker is generally recognized as the case that created
the state action doctrine in its current form, some scholars have argued that this is a
misconception, and that the doctrine can be traced to decisions prior to Parker, such as Olsen v.
Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904). Milton Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State
Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976).
25. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51.
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for First Amendment rights and the principles of federalism.26 The
antitrust immunities, therefore, were born from a desire to avoid a
conflict between antitrust laws and the First Amendment and
principles of federalism.
However, the goals of antitrust law are not only different from
but are also often inconsistent with the goals of the First Amendment
and federalism.27 While reading the Sherman Act to avoid this
conflict has appeal in its simplicity, it fails to recognize, grapple
with, and adequately resolve how to balance the important statutory
objective of protecting consumers with the need to preserve First
Amendment rights and the principles of federalism. Antitrust laws
exist to preserve economic freedom and the right to compete, and
while they may sometimes be in conflict with the First Amendment
and the principles of federalism, the freedoms they protect are no less
important than those protected by the Constitution and the United
States’ system of government.28 This Article will argue that, by
concluding that Congress never intended for antitrust law to regulate
in these areas, the Court gave undue deference to the First
Amendment and federalism. In doing so, the Court immunized
conduct that should be regulated because without regulation there is
nothing to stop anticompetitive conduct that is harmful to the
consumer. In order to allow antitrust laws to properly curb this
anticompetitive behavior, as well as to produce clear guidance in this
area for the lower courts, the Court must reassess these doctrines and
more effectively balance the goals of antitrust law with First
26. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138 (“The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the
Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these
freedoms.”); Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
27. See David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and
Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 295–96
(1994) (“One of the ways a firm can compete is by asking the government to confer a benefit on
the firm or to impose a burden on its competitors. Firms compete in this political ‘market’ for
economic benefits they cannot otherwise get in economic markets. . . . Companies that turn to the
political markets to gain a competitive advantage almost always do so in order to achieve an
anticompetitive result. If they could achieve the same result legally in the market—through
innovation or more efficient management, for example—the company would do so and save the
costs of transacting with the government.”).
28. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws . . . are as
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed
each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor,
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.”).
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Amendment and federalism concerns. Instead of construing antitrust
law to avoid the conflict, the Court should articulate a policy that
enables the lower courts to effectively and fairly balance these
competing goals. The Supreme Court must narrow the application of
these exceptions in a manner that will not only continue to protect
First Amendment rights and federalism but will also allow antitrust
law to serve its purpose—protecting the consumer.
Part II of this Article will discuss the development of the NoerrPennington and state action doctrines. It will look at the Supreme
Court cases that have shaped the two doctrines and will discuss the
contours of the doctrines as they exist today. Part III will
demonstrate how the Supreme Court has construed the Sherman Act
as separate from and inconsistent with the goals of Noerr and Parker.
It will then argue that this construction both has created
unnecessarily broad immunities—which leaves unregulated areas of
activity that need antitrust supervision—and has left lower courts
without a clear framework to follow. Part IV proposes that the Court,
instead of construing the doctrines to avoid a constitutional problem,
must actually perform an analysis that will enable antitrust law to
coexist with the First Amendment and federalism principles without
sacrificing protections for the consumer. By engaging in this
analysis, the Court can define the boundaries of the immunities and
create clearer guidelines for the lower courts to follow. This Article
proposes that the Court can scale back the immunities without
infringing on First Amendment rights or encroaching on state
sovereignty.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court created the Noerr-Pennington and state
action doctrines in three landmark cases.29 Since the Court created
the two doctrines, it has modified them by expanding and limiting
their application over time.30 However, since the creation of the
doctrines, these exceptions to antitrust law have proven to be not

29. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Noerr, 365 U.S. at
127; Parker, 317 U.S. at 341.
30. See infra Part II.A–B.
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only confusing but also harmful to the very goals antitrust law is
supposed to promote.31
A. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, efforts to lobby the
government for legislation, executive action, or judicial decisions are
immune from antitrust liability, even where the purpose of the action
is to restrain trade or is otherwise anticompetitive.32 In order to
qualify for immunity under this doctrine, the petition to the
government must be a genuine attempt to obtain governmental
action.33 A petition that is not actually intended to result in such
action is considered a “sham” and is not entitled to Noerr
immunity.34 A company, therefore, can lobby the state to enact laws
that would adversely affect their market competitors without facing
antitrust liability.35 This is the case even if the purpose of the
campaign is to put competitors out of business, provided that the
company is genuinely attempting to influence government action.36
1. Genesis of the Noerr Doctrine
The Supreme Court created the Noerr doctrine in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.37 In
Noerr, truckers alleged that a group of railroad companies violated
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by engaging in a publicity
campaign.38 The campaign sought to harm the competing trucking
industry by creating dislike for truckers among the public and
fostering support for measures, such as securing a veto of a law that
would have allowed trucks to carry heavier loads.39 A unanimous
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act does not prohibit attempts
to influence the legislature to pass a particular law, even if the law

31. See infra Part III.
32. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); Pennington, 381
U.S. at 657; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 127.
33. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
34. Id.
35. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139–40.
36. Id.
37. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
38. Id. at 129–30.
39. Id.
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would result in a monopoly.40 The Court rested its decision on a
finding that the Sherman Act was not intended to regulate political
activity, and therefore the railroads’ petitioning did not fall within
the scope of the Act.41 Thus, the Court held that “the Sherman Act
[did] not apply to the activities of the railroads at least insofar as
those activities comprised mere solicitation of governmental action
with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.”42
The Court also recognized that the case presented First
Amendment questions.43 For example, it noted the significance of the
right to petition and declined to “impute” to Congress an “intent to
invade” the “freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights.”44 Moreover,
the Court stated that a statute that created liability for efforts to
petition the government “would raise important constitutional
questions.”45 However, because it ultimately found that the Act was
not meant to regulate in the political arena, the Court did not conduct
any constitutional analysis.46 By failing to draw a line between the
goals of antitrust law and the constitutionally protected right to
petition, the Court failed to identify—let alone resolve—the conflict
between the First Amendment and antitrust law. As a result, the
Court created an excessively broad immunity that left lower courts
without clear guidelines to apply in similar cases.
2. The Court Used the Canon of Constitutional
Avoidance in Creating the Noerr Doctrine
The Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted statutes so as to
avoid a conflict with the Constitution.47 This canon of statutory

40. Id. at 136.
41. Id. at 137 (“To hold that the . . . people cannot freely inform the government of their
wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political
activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act.”).
42. Id. at 138.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 137–38.
46. Id.
47. Adam Eckstein, The Petition Clause and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Constitutional
and Consistency Arguments for Providing Noerr-Pennington Immunity to ADR, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1683, 1689 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted statutes narrowly so as to avoid
abridging the right of petition.”).
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interpretation is known as constitutional avoidance.48 However, the
Court has qualified this requirement by saying that courts are
required to construe the statute in a way that avoids a conflict only if
“an alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible.”49
Scholars and lower courts have considered Noerr to be an application
of this canon50 because the Court avoided a conflict between the
Sherman Act and the Constitution by saying that the Sherman Act
was simply not meant to regulate petitions to the government. 51 The
Court called an agreement to jointly petition the government for
legislation fundamentally dissimilar from the agreements that
typically violate the Sherman Act.52 The Court could not “lightly
impute to Congress an intent to invade [the] freedoms” protected by
the First Amendment53 and said that such an interpretation would
have no basis in the legislative history of the Sherman Act.54
However, in doing so, the Court failed to articulate exactly what type
of restrictions on anticompetitive behavior would invade those
freedoms.
3. Limitations of Noerr Immunity:
The Sham Exception
Although the Court subsequently expanded Noerr immunity to
apply in the context of petitions to the executive branch,55 the
judicial branch, and administrative agencies,56 the Court has also

48. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 931 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he rule of statutory
construction known as the canon of constitutional avoidance . . . requires a statute to be construed
so as to avoid serious doubts as to the constitutionality of an alternate construction.”).
49. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principal that
this court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.” (emphasis added)).
50. Sosa, 437 F.3d at 931 n.5 (“Noerr-Pennington is a specific application of . . . the canon
of constitutional avoidance.”).
51. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 141 (“The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the
business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena.”).
52. Id. at 136.
53. Id. at 138.
54. Id. at 137.
55. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670–71 (1965).
56. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972) (“[I]t
would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that groups with common
interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state
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placed some important limitations on the doctrine.57 Perhaps the
most notable limitation is the sham exception, which applies in
situations where the petition is “a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor.”58 Where the petition is
actually an attempt to interfere with a competitor’s business, liability
under the Sherman Act is appropriate.59 The Court applied the sham
exception for the first time in California Motor Transport.60 There, a
group of highway carriers brought an action against another group of
highway carriers, alleging that they violated the Sherman Act by
initiating several judicial and administrative proceedings to eliminate
the competition of other trucking groups.61 The plaintiffs alleged,
and the Court agreed, that the purpose of the proceedings was to
eliminate competition and put the other truckers out of business.62
The Court held that one baseless claim would likely not fall under
the sham exception, but a pattern of repetitive claims would be
considered an abuse of the administrative and judicial processes and,
as such, would fall squarely within the exception.63 Interestingly, the
Court justified its decision to deny Noerr immunity by pointing to
the fact that “First Amendment rights are not immunized from
regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct which
violates a valid statute.”64 Although the Court did not change the
essential understanding of Noerr—that the Sherman Act simply is
not meant to regulate in the political arena—the Court recognized
that it was looking to First Amendment principles to guide how the
doctrine, and specifically, the sham exception, should be applied.

and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution
of their business and economic interests vis-à-vis their competitors.”).
57. See, e.g., id. at 511 (applying the sham exception for the first time); id. at 513
(discussing a misrepresentation exception).
58. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
59. Id.
60. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 511.
61. Id. at 509.
62. See id. at 515.
63. Id. at 513.
64. Id. at 514.
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4. Limiting the Limitation:
Narrowing the Sham Exception
After California Motor Transport, there was much confusion
about the scope of the sham exception, and lower courts generally
applied it broadly.65 In 1988, in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
Indian Head, Inc. (“Allied Tube”),66 the Court sought to define the
sham exception and limit its application.67 Although it declined to
apply Noerr immunity, the Court held that a genuine effort to affect
governmental action cannot constitute a sham, even if the methods
used to effect the change are improper.68 The Court then narrowed
the exception even further in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. (“Omni”),69 where it held that the “‘sham’
exception to Noerr encompasses situations in which persons use the
governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—
as an anticompetitive weapon.”70 In Omni, the city council passed
legislation sought by Columbia Outdoor Advertising, which required
the council’s approval for all newly constructed billboards.71
Because Columbia sought to disrupt its competitors’ business
through the product of its lobbying efforts (the zoning ordinances)
rather than through the lobbying itself, the sham exception did not
apply, and Columbia was entitled immunity under Noerr.72 This
holding effectively limited the sham exception to the point that it will
almost never apply.73 In most situations, it is unlikely that the party
lobbying for anticompetitive action will want to harm its competitor

65. See Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 978 (2003) (noting that after “the Noerr/Pennington/California Motor
Transport trilogy . . . [m]any courts distorted ‘sham’ to make it apply to all forms of improper or
unethical petitioning conduct deemed not worthy of antitrust immunity”).
66. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
67. Lao, supra note 65, at 979–81.
68. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 507 n.10 (rejecting the dissent’s approach to the sham
exception, which would exclude from Noerr immunity a defendant’s genuine attempts to affect
the government if done through improper means); see also Lao, supra note 65, at 981 (“In
emphasizing that genuine efforts to influence government do not constitute sham, no matter how
improper the methods used, the Supreme Court radically changed the sham exception.” (emphasis
and footnote omitted)).
69. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
70. Id. at 380.
71. Id. at 367–69.
72. Id. at 381.
73. Id.
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only through the process of lobbying and not through the legislation
as well.74
Two years after Omni, the Court narrowed the sham exception
yet again in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc. (“PRE”)75 by creating a two-part test that
increases the plaintiff’s burden in proving that a petition is a sham
and therefore not immunized by Noerr.76 To satisfy the first part of
the test, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless.77 If it is objectively
baseless, a court then looks at the litigant’s subjective motivation for
bringing the lawsuit.78 This second prong is where the court
considers whether the petitioner seeks to interfere with competition
through the petitioning process, rather than through the outcome, as
outlined in Omni.79
5. Other Limitations of Noerr:
Exceptions for Fraud
Another potential limitation on Noerr immunity is a fraud or
misrepresentation exception.80 Although the Court in both California
Motor Transport and Allied Tube indicated in dicta that “fraud and
misrepresentations made in an adjudicatory context exceeded
Noerr’s reach [but] were immune in a legislative setting,” the Court
reopened the issue in PRE without giving an answer as to whether an
exception exists.81 Additionally, although the Court substantially
narrowed the sham exception in Allied Tube, it also limited the scope
of the Noerr doctrine generally by declining to extend immunity to

74. Lao, supra note 65, at 983 (“In view of Omni Outdoor Advertising, sham would rarely, if
ever, apply to any legislative lobbying because it is unlikely that one merely hopes to injure a
competitor through the process of petitioning for favorable legislation rather than through the
enactment itself.”).
75. 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
76. Id. at 60.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 60–61.
80. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499–500 (1988); Cal.
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512–13 (1972).
81. Lao, supra note 65, at 987–88; Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 61 n.6 (“We
need not decide here whether, and if so, to what extent Noerr permits the imposition of antitrust
liability for a litigant’s fraud or other misrepresentations.”); Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499–500;
Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512–13.
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all genuine efforts to influence government action.82 The Court held
that whether Noerr immunity applies in a particular case depends on
the nature, context, and impact of the activity.83
Although certain limitations on Noerr immunity exist, the Court
has continued to broaden the reach of the doctrine, as seen with the
narrowing of the sham exception.84 While it is unclear whether a
fraud or misrepresentation exception exists, the Court has
conclusively stated that there is no conspiracy exception to Noerr
immunity.85 The Court has also held that the incidental effects of
petitioning will be protected by Noerr immunity.86 Thus, in Allied
Tube, although petitioning a private standard-setting organization
was not itself covered by Noerr, the Court held that immunity might
still apply if petitioning the organization was incidental to a valid
effort to influence the government.87
B. The State Action Doctrine
The state action doctrine mandates that federal antitrust laws do
not apply to states acting in their sovereign capacity.88
Anticompetitive action qualifies for immunity under this doctrine if
it is authorized by a clearly articulated state regulatory policy and
subjected to active state supervision when the actor is a private
party89 For example, a state legislature can implement a regulatory

82. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 503.
83. Id. at 504.
84. See supra Part II.A.3; see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S.
365, 380 (1991) (rejecting a conspiracy exception to Noerr); Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502
(expanding Noerr protection to the incidental effects of petitioning as well as the petitioning
itself).
85. Omni, 499 U.S. at 383 (“[A] ‘conspiracy’ exception to Noerr must be rejected.”).
86. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502–03.
87. Id. The Court in Allied Tube declined to apply Noerr immunity because the injury
alleged in the case, a “restraint . . . imposed by persons unaccountable to the public and without
official authority, many of whom have personal financial interests in restraining competition,”
had resulted from private, rather than government action. Id. at 502. However, after declining to
extend Noerr immunity, the Court then went on to discuss the Noerr doctrine, deciding whether
Noerr might still apply because the petitioning of the association, whose actions the Court said
were not quasi-legislative, might have been incidental to a valid petitioning of the government.
Id.
88. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–52 (1943). While Parker is generally recognized as
the case that created the State Action doctrine in its current form, there are some scholars that
trace the doctrine to decisions prior to Parker. See supra note 24.
89. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
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policy that allows cities to choose which utility company to use. The
city may then grant a monopoly to a certain utility company pursuant
to that regulatory policy, even if the city’s purpose is anticompetitive
and otherwise violates antitrust laws.90
1. Evolution of the State Action Doctrine
The Court created the state action doctrine in Parker v. Brown.91
That case involved a California regulatory program that dictated how
raisin growers could market their crops.92 The purpose of the
program was to restrict competition among raisin growers and to
control the price of the raisins distributed to packers.93 A producer
and packer of raisins brought suit, claiming that the legislation was
anticompetitive and therefore violated the Sherman Act. 94 A
unanimous Court held that states acting in their sovereign capacity
are not subject to antitrust liability, even if the state action was
anticompetitive.95 In so holding, the Court emphasized that there was
nothing in either the language or history of the Act that would
suggest that this was the intent of the statute.96 The Court highlighted
the fact that the immunity is rooted in the principles of federalism,
saying that “[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign . . . an unexpressed purpose to
nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress.”97 However, just as the Court in Noerr skirted
the conflict between antitrust law and the First Amendment’s right to
petition by holding that the Sherman Act simply did not apply to
petitioning activity, the Court in Parker construed the Sherman Act
in a way that avoided any conflict with the principles of federalism.
The Court said that Congress did not intend to bring state action
within the realm of antitrust liability98 and found “nothing in the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See Parker, 317 U.S. at 352.
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Id. at 344–47.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 351–52.
Id. at 350–51.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 350–51.
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language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggest[ed] that
its purpose was to restrain a state.”99
However, the underlying problem that the Court sought to
resolve in creating the state action doctrine was a preemption
problem raised by the federalist system of government. 100 The
Supremacy Clause101 allows a court to invalidate a state law when
Congress expressly preempts state law, when there is a direct conflict
between state and federal law, or when Congress has left no room in
its regulatory scheme for states to regulate.102 Thus, it seems that
federal antitrust laws should preempt any state regulation in the
area.103 The Court did point to a federalism problem, stating that
“[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution,
the states are sovereign . . . an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress.”104 However, rather than engaging in a
discussion of when there would be a conflict between a state’s
sovereignty and the federal antitrust laws, the Court simply reiterated
that the legislative history of the Sherman Act showed that the Act
was not meant to regulate in this area at all.105
Since Parker, the Court has refined the state action doctrine.106
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum
(“Midcal”),107 the Court created a two-part test for state action

99. Id. at 350.
100. James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International
Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1555,
1568 (2010).
101. The Supremacy Clause states as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
102. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1568.
103. Id. at 1569–70 (“[T]he antitrust laws express a national policy in favor of competition
and . . . Congress acted to the fullest extent of its commerce powers when enacting the antitrust
laws.”) (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) and United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945)).
104. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
105. Id.
106. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980).
107. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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immunity.108 First, the challenged action must be taken pursuant to a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.109
Second, the state must actively supervise this conduct.110 However,
the Court has not clearly defined how this test should be applied.
Lower courts are split as to what level of supervision is sufficient to
satisfy Midcal’s requirement.111
The Supreme Court narrowed the active supervision requirement
in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.112 There, rating bureaus
organized by the defendant insurance companies were authorized by
four states to set joint rates for title searches.113 Once the bureau set
the rates, the rates became effective unless the state rejected them
within a certain period.114 The Court held that such a system of
review was not sufficient to satisfy the active supervision
requirement.115 The Court required more than “[s]ome basic level of
activity directed towards seeing that the private actors carry out the
state’s policy and not simply their own.”116 It required a showing that
“the State has played a substantial role in determining the specifics
of the economic policy.”117 Under the facts of this particular case, it
required that the state had determined the specifics of the rate-setting
scheme.118 However, apart from this fact-specific determination,
nowhere in the opinion did the Court provide guidance about how
much supervision would be sufficient to meet its requirement that the
state play a substantial role.119
Additionally, the Court has not clarified what constitutes a
“clearly articulated” state policy under the first prong of the test.120
108. Id. at 105.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Peter Hettich, Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not Work, 5
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 105, 130–33 (2006).
112. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
113. Id. at 629.
114. Id. (calling this approval system a “negative option” system).
115. Id. at 637.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 635.
118. Id. at 638.
119. Justice O’Connor recognized the majority decision’s flaw in her dissent. Id. at 647
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Although arguing for a more flexible requirement, she noted that “the
majority does not offer any guidance as to what level of supervision will suffice.” Id.
120. The Court has applied several different standards, including that the authorization be
“affirmatively expressed,” Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97,
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The language used by the Court in Midcal seemed to reflect the
Court’s desire to give deference to states in implementing their own
regulations.121 However, the Court stepped back from this
requirement in both Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
(“Hallie”)122 and Southern Motor Carriers when it held that
anticompetitive conduct need only be “foreseeable” from a state’s
grant of power in order for it to be considered authorized under a
clearly articulated policy.123 Lower courts have been unsure whether
foreseeability is enough.124 The Tenth Circuit recently noted this
confusion, pointing to some Supreme Court cases that required an
affirmatively expressed grant of authority to suppress competition
and others that required “something less of cities seeking to invoke
Parker’s protections”—namely, those that suggest that foreseeability
is sufficient.125 The court then concluded that, “though it’s hard to
see a way to reconcile all of the Court’s competing statements in this
area, we can say with certainty this much—a municipality surely
lacks antitrust ‘immunity’ unless it can bear the burden of showing
that its challenged conduct was at least a foreseeable (if not explicit)
result of state legislation.”126
Because of this ill-defined standard, the lower courts have
different ways of determining whether there is a clearly articulated
state policy, which has resulted in both broad and narrow
applications of the foreseeability standard.127 For example, the
Seventh Circuit recently applied this standard very broadly, holding
that “it is generally understood that the authority to contract
105 (1980), that anticompetitive conduct “logically would result,” from the state’s authorization,
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985), and that anticompetitive conduct is
a foreseeable result of the state’s policy. Id.
121. Hettich, supra note 111, at 111 (explaining that Midcal immunized actions “emanating
from a sovereign state, i.e. actions, which can be attributed directly to the state” and thereby
granted “immunity [to] private actors . . . when obeying anticompetitive regulation enacted by a
sovereign entity”).
122. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
123. Id. at 42; S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 65
(1982).
124. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, Okla., 647 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (10th Cir. 2011).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1043.
127. Compare Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying
the test broadly), with Shames v. Cal. Travel & Tourism Comm’n, 626 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2010)
(applying the test narrowly); see also Hettich, supra note 111, at 122–26 (discussing several cases
where the foreseeability standard was applied both narrowly and broadly).
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contemplates the power to create exclusive contracts.”128 Thus, a
monopoly and other anticompetitive conduct was the foreseeable
result of a statute that allowed a city to enter into contracts for waste
disposal.129 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a
foreseeable result cannot create state authorization itself. . . . Rather,
‘foreseeability’ is to be used in deciding the reach of antitrust
immunity that stems from an already authorized [anticompetitive
conduct]”.130 Recently, in an attempt to make sense of these
conflicting views, the Tenth Circuit identified “at least a few bright
lines . . . in this muddled arena.”131 First, there must be more than the
traditional grant of authority in a municipal charter.132 Second, that a
state authorized some anticompetitive conduct does not mean all
other anticompetitive conduct is foreseeable.133 Third, to determine
whether a state authorized anticompetitive conduct, the court must
look at “the most specific direction issued by the state legislature on
the subject.”134 However, even applying the Tenth Circuit’s brightline rules, it is far from clear what makes anticompetitive conduct
foreseeable.135
The Court has also held that while a municipality is not itself
sovereign and therefore not per se exempted from antitrust law, the
state can use a city to implement its own clearly articulated
128. Active Disposal, Inc., 635 F.3d at 889.
129. Id.; see also Massengale v. City of Jefferson, Mo., No. 10-CV-4232-NKL, 2011 WL
3320508 slip op. at *8 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2011) (holding that although the state did not
“expressly grant municipalities the power to grant exclusive solid waste disposal contracts,” the
clearly articulated policy requirement was met because displacing competition was “a necessary
and reasonable consequence of engaging in the authorized activity,” regulating solid waste
disposal); Metro W. Ambulance v. Clark Cnty., Wash., No. C10-5809RJB, 2011 WL 7153926, at
*13 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 22, 2011) (granting state action immunity to a county where the county
granted an exclusive contract to an ambulance service, because this contract was the foreseeable
result of a state law that authorized any county to establish a system of ambulance service and
award contracts for ambulance service).
130. Shames, 626 F.3d at 1084.
131. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, Okla., 647 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 2011).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1043–44.
134. Id. at 1044.
135. Id. at 1043 (“[W]hat does and doesn’t qualify as foreseeable is hardly ‘self-evident’ or
self-defining, itself perhaps another reason to eschew the [foreseeability] test.”). The Court then
found that it was “clear” that the defendant in the case did not enjoy immunity because the state
had not authorized the anticompetitive behavior. Id. at 1044. It is interesting that the court would
use this language after discussing the confusion that exists within the test and then reverse the
district court’s dismissal of the case in favor of the defendant.
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policies.136 Similarly, regulatory agencies are not per se immune
from antitrust laws, but a state can also use a regulatory agency to
implement its own policy.137 However, it is unclear whether these
regulatory agencies should be treated more like private actors or
municipalities.138 In Hallie, after holding that active supervision is
not required for municipalities, the Court said in a footnote, “In cases
in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active supervision
would also not be required, although we do not here decide that
issue.”139 Thus, lower courts have been left without any guidance on
whether they should require active supervision for state regulatory
boards and other similar state entities. In North Carolina State Board
of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission,140 the North
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners (“the Board”) brought an action
against the FTC, seeking a declaration that active supervision is not
required for immunity to apply to regulatory agencies under the state
action doctrine.141 In the underlying proceeding, the Board claimed
that it was immune from antitrust liability under the state action
doctrine, but the FTC denied the Board’s motion, saying that the
Board did not qualify for exemption because its conduct was not
actively supervised by the state.142 The court noted that “the law is
unsettled as to whether or not [the Board] is subject to the antitrust
laws under the Parker state action doctrine,” citing both Hallie and
F.T.C. v. Monahan,143 a 1987 First Circuit decision that held that
active supervision may be required for state regulatory boards.144
Thus, while the parameters of the doctrine have been defined, how
and when the doctrine applies is not entirely clear.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978).
S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 68 (1982).
Hettich, supra note 111, at 117–18.
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46–47 & n.10 (1985).
768 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D.N.C. 2011).
Id. at 822.
Id. at 820–21.
832 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1987).
F.T.C., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
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2. Expansions of State Action Immunity
As with Noerr, the Court has both expanded and limited state
action immunity.145 Generally, the Court has limited the doctrine by
requiring that state action is authorized and actively supervised by
the state.146 Additionally, the Court has held that a home-rule
provision, by which a state gives a city blanket authority to create its
own regulations and policies, is not sufficient for antitrust immunity
because it does not satisfy the “clearly articulated . . . policy” prong
of the Midcal test.147
However, there have been several significant expansions of the
doctrine. As with Noerr, the Court has refused to recognize a
conspiracy exception to state action immunity.148 Before Omni,
several courts had refused to grant state action immunity where local
government officials had conspired with private parties to act
anticompetitively.149 Those courts relied on the language of Parker,
which suggested that the Court would not have granted immunity if a
state or municipality had combined with others to restrain trade.150
However, the Omni Court rejected this interpretation of Parker,
holding that Parker “simply clar[ified] that [state action] immunity
does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory
capacity but as a commercial participant in a given market.”151 Thus,
in Omni, the fact that the city council had not only agreed with but
had also been paid by its local constituents to enact a regulation in
their favor did not preclude state action immunity.152 The Court
refused to create such an exception on the assumption that it is
145. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374 (1991);
Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982) (holding that a home rule
provision is not sufficient for immunity).
146. Only state action that meets these standards will be immunized under Parker. Cal. Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
147. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54–55.
148. Omni, 499 U.S. at 374.
149. See, e.g., Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3rd Cir. 1975), abrogated by 499 U.S.
365; Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641, 646 (D.S.C. 1975); see also E. Thomas
Sullivan, Antitrust Regulation of Land Use: Federalism’s Triumph over Competition, the Last
Fifty Years, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 473, 480–81 (2000) (discussing the former conspiracy
exception and citing to Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 73 (8th Cir.
1982) and Witworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated 435 U.S. 992 (1978)).
150. Sullivan, supra note 149, at 481.
151. Omni, 499 U.S. at 374–75.
152. Id. at 378.
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“desirable for legislators and their constituents to agree to pursue a
[certain] policy.”153 Creating an exception to state action immunity
would subject legislators to antitrust liability in such a situation,
which was a consequence the Court wished to avoid.154
Many other expansions of the doctrine apply to immunize the
actions taken by municipalities. In Hallie, the Court held that active
supervision is not required for municipalities.155 The Court reasoned
that municipalities are unlikely to act in the interest of private parties,
and that the requirement of a clearly articulated state policy alleviates
any danger that they will act for “purely parochial public interests at
the expense of more overriding state goals.”156 The Court also held
that the state need not compel the municipality to enact the policy in
order for the immunity to apply.157 Rather, it is sufficient that the
state authorize the municipality to engage in anticompetitive
behavior.158 Further, the Hallie Court introduced a foreseeability
standard, immunizing the municipality’s activity so long as
anticompetitive conduct could logically result from the authority
granted to the municipality by the state.159 In Southern Motor
Carriers, the Court expanded its holding in Hallie and held that
compulsion is not required for private actors either.160 The Court
stayed consistent with the foreseeability standard it established in
Hallie, saying that there need not be detailed, specific authorization
for private anticompetitive action as long as it is clear that the state
intends to displace competition in a specific area.161

153. Id. at 375 (“[I]t is both inevitable and desirable that public officials often agree to do
what one or another group of private citizens urges upon them.”); McGowan & Lemley, supra
note 27, at 350.
154. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 350; see also Duke & Co., 521 F.2d at 1282
(holding a claim could be stated against antitrust defendants, despite their governmental status
because “it is clear that when there is an allegation of governmental participation in [a
combination of public and private entities] to the benefit or detriment of private parties . . . a
claim has been stated under the antitrust laws”).
155. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46–47 (1985).
156. Id. at 47.
157. Id. at 45–46.
158. Id. at 45.
159. Id. at 42.
160. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 60 (1985).
161. Id. at 65–66.

1318

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1295

III. CRITIQUE
Because the Court has failed to recognize a conflict between the
goals of the antitrust laws on the one hand and the First Amendment
and federalism on the other, the Court has not used a principled
method of creating the boundaries of the Noerr or state action
immunities. The sham exception to the Noerr doctrine is far too
narrow and is ineffective as a limit. The lack of a misrepresentation
exception creates additional problems within the doctrine because it
undermines the democratic process. Additionally, the foreseeability
standard within the state action doctrine requires almost nothing in
terms of a clear state policy before it immunizes the anticompetitive
conduct of a municipality or a private actor. Municipalities are left to
act in their own best interests since they are exempted from the
active supervision requirement. As a result, both the Noerr and state
action doctrines are far too broad, and consequently, consumers are
harmed because they do not receive the protection of antitrust laws.
A. The Court Misinterpreted
the Sherman Act by Using the
Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
The Noerr Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act, by which
the conflict between the First Amendment and antitrust laws was
avoided, is inaccurate in light of the Act’s legislative history. The
Court held that there was no basis in the legislative history of the
Sherman Act to regulate political activity rather than business
activity.162 However, “part of the ‘public outcry’ generally seen as
leading to the passage of the Sherman Act involved the widely held
view that the nineteenth-century economic giants . . . secured and
maintained their monopolies through unethical economic and
political practices.”163 In one of the speeches Senator Sherman made
in defense of his bill, he included the political influence of the trusts
as a reason to take legislative action.164 Further, the common law,
which was expressly incorporated into the Sherman Act, condemned
monopolies obtained by deceptive or coercive petitioning of the

162. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961).
163. Faulkner, supra note 1, at 696 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted).
164. Id. at 697.
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legislature.165 Thus, it seems clear that the Sherman Act’s drafters
did intend the Act to apply in the political arena.166 Further,
protection of free speech and the development of First Amendment
jurisprudence did not gather momentum until the 1930s.167 At the
time Congress enacted the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court had not
even applied the First Amendment right to petition.168 However, by
the time Noerr was decided in 1961, First Amendment jurisprudence
had been developed and strengthened, so it was recognized that the
government was prohibited from interfering with the political
activities of its citizens.169 Thus, at that time, “[t]he political process,
by which information is conveyed and desires expressed, [was]
considered too important to be restricted by concerns for . . .
economic liberty.”170 Therefore, while the Noerr Court held that
there was no basis in the history of the Sherman Act for applying
antitrust laws to political activity, it seems more likely that the Court
was simply reacting to the prevailing norms of its time. The Court’s
intention likely was to give utmost deference to citizens in
petitioning and speech activity. However, instead of creating an
exception to the Sherman Act out of deference to the First
Amendment, the Court incorrectly stated that the Sherman Act was
not meant to regulate this area.
B. The Noerr Court’s Failure to Recognize a Conflict
Between Antitrust Law and the First Amendment in
Has Resulted in an Excessively Broad Immunity
Although it was a simple solution for the Court to construe the
Sherman Act to avoid any conflict with the First Amendment, the
goals of antitrust law and the goals of the First Amendment do

165. Id. at 702.
166. Id. at 697–99 (discussing a speech by Senator Sherman, 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890), in
support of Sherman’s bill, and arguing that he would exempt a farmers’ lobby not because “his
bill only applied to ‘economic’ or ‘trade’ activity or that all attempts to ‘affect public opinion’
[were] excluded from the bill’s broad language,” but because Sherman viewed the lobby as
having a beneficial purpose).
167. See id. at 707.
168. Id. at 704.
169. See id. at 708.
170. Id.
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frequently conflict.171 The First Amendment protects the citizens’
request for governmental action,172 but when those requests or the
result of the requests create anticompetitive effects, they naturally
conflict with antitrust laws.173 Although, under the Supremacy
Clause, the Constitution must prevail when a conflict arises, the
Supreme Court made Noerr immunity unnecessarily complicated by
not recognizing that a conflict exists when it created the doctrine.174
Instead of creating an exception to antitrust law, where immunity is
carved out in deference to the First Amendment, the Court said that
antitrust law did not apply at all.175 Although it seems that the result
would be the same, by taking the First Amendment issue out of the
equation altogether, the Court failed to create any boundaries to the
doctrine.176 If there is no conflict and the Sherman Act simply does
not apply, it is much harder for the courts to know when to apply
Noerr than it would be if they could use the First Amendment as a
guideline. The Supreme Court’s failure has resulted in the
development of an unclear doctrine, which is too broad and which
the lower courts are still applying inconsistently fifty years after it
was created.177

171. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 297 (“[A] statutory preference for competition
may conflict with a constitutional mandate for self-government and freedom of speech.”).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
173. Lao, supra note 65, at 966 (“[W]hen efforts to persuade the government produce
anticompetitive effects, they necessarily also impinge upon antitrust law, creating tension
between that law and the First Amendment and related values.”); McGowan & Lemley, supra
note 27, at 296 (“[P]etitioning, in and of itself, can have dramatically anticompetitive effects,
even if the petitioning is unsuccessful.”).
174. The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, any conflict between constitutional law and antitrust law must be
decided in favor of the Constitution. However, as the doctrine currently exists, the Court is not
just giving deference to the Constitution since the Court said that antitrust law was not meant to
regulate in this area. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
138 (1961). If the Court explicitly recognizes the conflict between the First Amendment and
antitrust law, even though the First Amendment must prevail, the Court can still narrow Noerr
while respecting the tension between and the hierarchy of these principles.
175. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 300 (“The Court is clear that it does not want
to encroach on the First Amendment rights identified in Noerr. . . . But the Court has not used
First Amendment principles in defining the scope of the doctrine.”).
176. Id. (The “doctrine [has] developed solely by the desire to avoid a problem—trampling
upon First Amendment rights—without reference to a theory that tells us when that problem
arises or why.”).
177. See id. at 300–01, 363.
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1. Is the Sham Exception Itself a Sham?
The Court could have used the sham exception as a tool to
narrow the reach of Noerr immunity.178 However, the exception has
grown increasingly confusing and has been narrowed to the point
where it is almost impossible to claim that something is a sham.179
As such, it is ineffective as a limit to Noerr.180 The result of such a
narrow exception is the immunization of too many petitions that,
whether or not successful, give petitioners room to overcharge
consumers and eliminate competitors.181 Petitioners are able to use
the petitioning process to raise costs for their competitors or to delay
the entry of competitors into the market. Even if the petition is
eventually unsuccessful, the effect of the petition itself may eliminate
competition and allow the petitioner to raise prices without
competing products or services to bring those prices down.182
a. The PRE test raises the bar too high
and fails to protect the consumer
While the language of the PRE test may seem straightforward,183
it is unclear how the test should be applied in practice. Much of this
confusion was caused by the language Justice Thomas used in
PRE.184 He did not clearly explain what “objectively baseless”
meant, but instead defined an objectively baseless lawsuit as one in
which “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on
the merits”; one that lacked probable cause, as in the tort of

178. See Lao, supra note 65, at 980–81 (arguing that the Allied Tube Court drastically
narrowed the sham exception where, given the breadth of the exception at the time, it could have
held that the conduct in PRE was a sham and therefore not immune from antitrust liability).
179. See id. at 981 & n.116.
180. See Stacey B. Lee, Is a Cure on the Way? The Bad Medicine of Generics, Citizen
Petitions, and Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 98, 119–20 (2010)
(describing how sham is ineffective in keeping out sham petitions in the brand drug industry).
181. Id. at 124.
182. Id.
183. In order for a petition to be considered a sham, the two-part PRE test requires first that
the petition be objectively baseless so that “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits[,]” and second, that the petitioners’ subjective motivation for the petition
was an attempt to directly disrupt the business of a competitor. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc.
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993); see also supra Part II.A.4
(discussing the PRE test).
184. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60, 62–63, 65; see also Lao, supra note 65, at
985–86 (describing the various ways Justice Thomas defined “objectively baseless).
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malicious prosecution; and one that was not warranted by existing
law or based on a good faith argument for the modification of the
law, as in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”).185 Justice
Thomas borrowed the language of Rule 11 and the requirements for
malicious prosecution to define objectively baseless, but, as Justice
Souter pointed out in his concurrence, the Rule 11 test and the
requirements for malicious prosecution are not the same.186 Thus,
what it means for a petition to be objectively baseless is unclear at
best. As one commentator pointed out, “Many cases may be
sufficiently weak that a reasonable litigant could not realistically
expect success and yet not be so devoid of merit as to lack probable
cause.”187 Moreover, while most people read PRE as a narrowing of
the Court’s earlier application of the sham exception, the Ninth
Circuit views the PRE and California Motor Transport tests as
inconsistent and attempts to “reconcile these cases by reading them
as applying to different situations.”188 The Ninth Circuit applies the
two-part PRE analysis to cases in which a single action may be sham
petitioning but applies California Motor Transport to cases where a
whole series of legal proceedings may constitute sham petitioning.189
In the latter situation, the court does not look at whether any of the
proceedings had merit but instead looks at whether collectively they
are brought for the purpose of harming or harassing a market rival.190
The lack of clarity surrounding the PRE test makes it much more
difficult for those harmed by petitions to claim an antitrust violation
since it is unclear what will be enough to prove a sham.
Additionally, the test that Justice Thomas articulated, which
equates objectively baseless petitions with a lack of probable cause,
is far too broad.191 The PRE Court said that a winning lawsuit

185. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60, 62–63, 65; see also Lao, supra note 65, at
985–86 (describing the various ways Justice Thomas defined “objectively baseless”).
186. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 66–67 (Souter, J., concurring).
187. Lao, supra note 65, at 986.
188. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1046 (2009)
(quoting USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F.3d 800,
810 (9th Cir. 1994)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Lee, supra note 180, at 120 (“[T]he sham exception is unnecessarily restricted when the
majority equates objectively baseless with a lack of probable cause.”).
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precludes a finding that the suit is objectively baseless.192 Further,
the court must not assume that a losing lawsuit was unreasonable or
without foundation.193 Thus, from the outset, it will be difficult to
find that a petition is objectively baseless.194 The current test “allows
[an antitrust defendant] to present a sufficiently weak citizen petition
with no reasonable expectation of success” and protects that petition
because it is “not so devoid of merit as to lack probable cause.”195
This sets the bar too high for proving a sham petition and often
results in increased cost to the consumer, who without the sham
exception has no tools to prove an antitrust violation.196 For example,
in Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis,197 the court held
that a petition to the FDA was not a sham, even though the defendant
petitioner may have had no reasonable belief that the petition was
viable.198 Instead, the court believed that the petitioner’s arguments
were “arguably warranted by existing law or at the very least [ ]based
on an objectively good faith argument for the extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.”199 Using this language to determine
whether the petition was objectively baseless allowed the court to
conclude that the petition was not a sham, regardless of the fact that
192. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 n.5
(1993).
193. Id.
194. See Lee, supra note 180, at 120; see also Lao, supra note 65, at 1025 (discussing the
requirements and effect of the objectively baseless requirement).
195. Lee, supra note 180, at 120.
196. If the petition is not considered a sham, unless the petition involves fraudulent or false
information and the jurisdiction recognizes a misrepresentation exception that applies to that case,
the petition will be immunized by Noerr and those harmed by the anticompetitive effects of the
petition have no recourse through antitrust law to protect themselves.
197. No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2008 WL 169362 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2008).
198. Id. at *5 [hereinafter LWD Ruling on Motion to Dismiss].
199. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2009 WL 2708110,
at *4, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009) [hereinafter LWD] (internal quotation marks omitted). In this
case, Aventis, a drug manufacturer, filed a citizen petition with the FDA requesting that the FDA
deny approval of any generic version of its drug, Arava. Id. at *1. The FDA denied the citizen
petition, noting that Aventis' petition appeared to be based on a false premise. Id. at *2 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original). LWD, a wholesale drug company, then filed an
antitrust action against Aventis claiming that Aventis’s petition was a sham designed to delay the
entry of the generic drug into the market. Id. at *1. At trial, LWD introduced evidence that
Aventis’s request for relief in the petition was contrary to FDA regulations and practices, and that
the petition lacked scientific basis. Id. at *2. On Aventis’s motion to dismiss, the court had even
pointed out that it was plausible that Aventis could have had no reasonable belief that its petition
was viable. LWD Ruling on Motion to Dismiss at *5. Aventis was familiar with the FDA
regulations and practices and had been subjected to the same regulations it now contested. Id.
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the petition seemed to have little merit and was clearly harmful to the
plaintiff and other consumers.200 The PRE test’s high bar allowed the
defendant to submit its petition without antitrust liability and
protected the petitioner’s activity at the expense of the consumer.201
b. The subjective intent requirement
swallows the sham exception
If the plaintiff is able to overcome the objectively baseless
hurdle, the court then asks whether the petitioner’s subjective intent
was to disrupt a competitor’s business rather than to obtain action
from the government.202 This extra requirement makes the sham
exception essentially ineffective.203 First, even if the petition is
objectively baseless, there will almost never be a situation where the
petitioner does not wish for success on the merits.204 Even if he does
not expect to win, winning would ultimately help him, and thus, it is
very difficult to prove that a petitioner’s sole intent was to interfere
with the business of his competitor.205
Second, by focusing on whether a petitioner’s intent was to
achieve anticompetitive action through the results of a successful
petition, the Court fails to look at how these results were obtained.206
Even if a defendant uses the petition itself to harm the competitor, as
long as the defendant actually wanted the results of a successful
petition, the defendant’s conduct will be immunized. This allows the
200. The court considered Aventis’s arguments enough to give Aventis probable cause to file
the petition, which precluded the petition from being objectively baseless. LWD at *7. Thus, the
court protected the petition, which the FDA and even the court believed to have little to no merit,
even though the petition allowed Aventis to maintain a monopoly over the drug for five months.
Complaint at 2, La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ 7343, 2007 WL 3320445
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) [hereinafter LWD Complaint].
201. LWD alleged that the monopoly created by the petition allowed Aventis to overcharge
direct purchasers of the drug “by millions of dollars by depriving them of the results of
competition from cheaper generic versions of Arava.” LWD Complaint at 9. Additionally, within
three months of the generic drug being approved and starting to sell on the market, Aventis lost
almost 80 percent of its $235 million in annual sales of the drug. Id. at 8.
202. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61
(1993).
203. Lee, supra note 180, at 120; see also Lao, supra note 65, at 986 (arguging that the
subjective prong may eviscerate the sham exception).
204. See Lao, supra note 65, at 986–87.
205. Id. at 983 (“[P]etitioners usually have mixed motives: they wish to secure the soughtafter government action, and they also wish to harm competitors through the process.”).
206. See id.
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defendant to abuse the system at the expense of the consumer.207 For
example, in Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories, Inc.,208 the Ninth Circuit held that the filing of
seventeen lawsuits did not constitute sham petitioning because the
petitioner, Abbott, sought success on the merits.209 However, the
court, in applying the subjective prong, failed to consider the fact
that whether or not Abbott desired the intended result of the lawsuits,
it was nevertheless able to delay the introduction of the generic drug,
a drug that would cost significantly less for the consumer.210 Abbott
was protected from antitrust liability because the current test only
looks at whether it was possible to win the lawsuits and whether
there was a chance that the petitioner really wanted to win the
lawsuits.
c. Sham immunizes antitrust defendants
that can afford to pay for protection
The test for sham petitioning also provides protection for
antitrust defendants that have the money to achieve the results they
desire at the cost of the consumer.211 For example, in Omni, the

207. See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.
2009); Armstrong Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 185 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.
1999). In Armstrong, the court held that a hospital’s petition was not a sham, regardless of its
merit, because the hospital genuinely sought the results of its petition. Armstrong, 185 F.3d at 158
n.2. There, a local hospital presented false information to the Department of Health, which was at
the time considering whether to approve a competing surgical facility. Id. at 155–56. The court
refused to consider whether the hospital’s opposition was a sham because even if the petition was
objectively baseless, the hospital’s purpose was to obtain denial of the application. Id. at 158 n.2.
208. 552 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2009)
209. Id. at 1047. Abbott, a prescription drug manufacturer, filed seventeen lawsuits against
other drug manufacturers that sought approval by the FDA to introduce a generic version of
Abbott’s drug. Id. at 1046. By filing the lawsuits, Abbott received an automatic thirty-month stay
on FDA approval of the generic drugs. Id. at 1039. The court concluded that these seventeen suits
did not constitute a sham, even though Abbott lost ten of them, because Abbott brought them in
order to protect its patents. Id. at 1047.
210. Id. at 1041. The plaintiff, a healthcare provider that purchased large quantities of
prescription drugs, had paid 67–70 cents per tablet. Id. After the generic brand was available, it
paid only 10 cents per tablet. Id. The drug at issue in the case generated $540 million in sales in
1998 alone. Id. at 1038. Thus, the automatic thirty-month stay on all applications to produce the
generic drug that resulted from the filing of patent infringement suits, whether or not Abbott
actually expected or wanted to win those suits, could have resulted in over a billion dollars in
revenue for the company.
211. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 368–69 (1991).
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Court considered that Columbia212 sought anticompetitive results
through the product of its lobbying efforts rather than through the
lobbying itself. The Court held that Columbia’s petition was not a
sham and thus was protected from antitrust liability.213 Under the
Court’s current test, the petition in question clearly was not a sham.
However, the Court was so focused on the fact that Columbia
actually wanted to see the legislation passed that it held that “any
denial to Omni of ‘meaningful access to the appropriate city
administrative and legislative fora’ was achieved by [Columbia] in
the course of an attempt to influence governmental action that, far
from being a ‘sham,’ was if anything more in earnest than it should
have been.”214 Because Columbia’s goal of getting the legislation
passed was the only thing that mattered in determining whether the
petition was a sham, the Court actually sanctioned the fact that
Columbia’s competitors were denied access to the city council
because Columbia had essentially bribed its members.215 As a result,
Columbia, which essentially bought legislation from its city council
that prevented other companies from effectively competing with it,
was immunized from liability.216 This problem is compounded by the
lack of conspiracy exceptions in both the Noerr and state action
doctrines.217

212. Columbia was a billboard company that controlled 95 percent of the billboard market. Id.
at 367. Columbia sought to interfere with the business of Omni, a competing billboard company,
by petitioning the city council for legislation that would prohibit the construction of new
billboards. Id. at 368. Columbia was run by a family with strong ties to the community and with
close personal relationships with many of the city’s public officials. Id. at 367. Columbia
provided funds and free billboard space to the council members from whom it sought this
legislation. Id.
213. Id. at 383–84.
214. Id. at 382.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 384.
217. Because Omni held that a conspiracy does not preclude immunity under either doctrine,
“a corrupt purpose to restrain competition in a state or state-authorized municipal regulatory
program will not defeat immunity.” Bob Nichols & Eric Schmitt, Antitrust Violations, 48 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 335, 358 (2011).

Summer 2012]

DEFERENCE OR DESTRUCTION?

1327

2. The Lack of a
Misrepresentation Exception
Undermines the Democratic Process
Because the Court has left open the question of whether a fraud
or misrepresentation exception exists, lower courts have been highly
inconsistent in recognizing and applying the exception.218 The courts
that do recognize the exception have done so on a limited basis, such
as by recognizing the exception only in an adjudicative proceeding
and then requiring that the misrepresentation be both intentional and
material.219 Additionally, the Supreme Court has said that if such an
exception exists, it applies only to adjudicatory petitions, not to
administrative or legislative petitions.220
Because the Court has excluded petitioning activity from the
reach of antitrust law rather than creating an exception for petitions
due to First Amendment concerns, the courts can and have
immunized petitions based on intentional misrepresentations, even
though that petitioning activity would not be protected under the
First Amendment.221 This has resulted in a doctrine under which
citizens are allowed to ask the government to suppress competition
218. United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1123–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(declining to extend Noerr immunity where defendants falsely “publicly denied, distorted, and
minimized the hazards of smoking for decades” because Noerr “does not protect deliberately
false or misleading statements”); Michael v. Letchinger, No. 10 C 3897, 2011 WL 3471082, at
*11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2011) (recognizing a “fraudulent misrepresentation” exception within the
sham exception but granting Noerr immunity to defendants because the petition was not made in
an adjudicative setting); see also Lao, supra note 65, at 988 (discussing different courts’
treatment of the exception).
219. See, e.g., Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 843 (7th Cir. 2011)
(requiring that the misrepresentation be “intentionally made, with knowledge of its falsity [and]
material, in the sense that it actually altered the outcome of the proceeding”); Cheminor Drugs,
Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 124 (3rd Cir. 1999) (“[A] material misrepresentation that
affects the very core of a litigant’s . . . case will preclude Noerr-Pennington immunity.”); Kottle
v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[L]itigation can be deemed a sham if
a party’s knowing fraud upon, or its intentional misrepresentations to, the court deprive the
litigation of its legitimacy.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
220. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499–500 (1988);
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Head Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). Although these
cases indicated that misrepresentation or fraud would only preclude Noerr immunity in the
adjudicatory context, the Court later reopened the issue in PRE. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc.
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 61 n.6. (1993). However, lower courts continue to
apply the exception only to adjudicatory petitions. See Mercatus Grp., 641 F.3d at 844 (quoting
language from both Allied Tube and Cal. Motor Transport).
221. The First Amendment does not protect petitions that are based on a misrepresentation or
fraud. Philip Morris USA, 566 F.3d at 1123.
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even if the information they give the government in support of that
petition is knowingly false.222 For example, in Mercatus Group, LLC
v. Lake Forest Hospital, the court gave Noerr immunity to the
defendant’s petitions even though the petitions were based on false
information because it found that the board considering the petitions
was acting in a legislative rather than an adjudicative capacity and
that the misrepresentation exception therefore did not apply.223
Immunizing petitions that are based on false and fraudulent
information fosters an abuse of the governmental process.224 The
democratic process relies on accurate information to make informed
decisions. Petitions based on false information impede the ability of
the democratic system to work the way it is meant to work.225 Based
on the foregoing, there does not appear to be any justification to
protect this type of unethical and harmful petition.
C. The Parker Court’s Failure to Recognize
the Conflict Between Antitrust Laws and Federalism Principles
Has Left State Action Essentially Unregulated
The Court’s choice to ignore the conflict between the principles
of federalism and the national antitrust laws has essentially left state
action unregulated.226 By holding that antitrust law does not apply in
the area of state action, the Court has created a state action doctrine
that is both unclear and overly broad.227 This choice has eroded the
protection that antitrust law is meant to provide to the consumer.228
222. See Mercatus Grp., 641 F.3d at 849.
223. Id. In Mercatus, Mercatus Group intended to open a new physician center that would
compete with Lake Forest Hospital. Id. at 837. In order to protect itself from this competition, the
Hospital petitioned members of the Village Board to deny the permits and approval necessary for
Mercatus to build its center. Id. at 837–38. The Hospital also launched a public-relations
campaign designed to get the community to pressure the Board to stop the construction of the
new center. Id. Mercatus claimed that the hospital, both in its petitions to the Village Board and
its public relations campaign, “drastically misrepresented, among other things, the extent to
which the Mercatus physician center would harm the Hospital.” Id. at 841. Mercatus alleged that
the Hospital’s claims that it would lose $2 million, would be unable to provide charity care, and
would ultimately go out of business was a lie. Id. All of this information, which the court
assumed was misrepresented by the Hospital, informed the Village Board’s decision to deny
approval for construction of Mercatus’s center.
224. Lao, supra note 65, at 1016.
225. Id.
226. See infra Part III.B.1–3.
227. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 108. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a
case that will review the scope of the state action doctrine. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health
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1. Midcal Foreseeability
Regardless of whether the foreseeability standard for
municipalities and private actors is read broadly or narrowly, within
the context of state action immunity generally, the standard is too
broad.229 As one commentator put it, “the foreseeability standard has
proven to be of no bite.”230 Unless a state specifically authorizes
anticompetitive action, the broader the state’s grant of authority, the
more likely a court will hold that anticompetitive conduct was
foreseeable.231 If the state does not specify what type of conduct it is
authorizing, anticompetitive conduct could almost always be a
foreseeable result.232 Thus, the foreseeability standard significantly
waters down the requirements of the first prong of the Midcal test
and makes it much easier for a court to grant Parker immunity.233
When courts immunize conduct because it was simply
foreseeable rather than expressly authorized by the state, they are
immunizing conduct that does not fall within the regulatory policy of
the state. Because the state action doctrine says that the Sherman Act
was not meant to regulate in this area, this type of conduct can be
immunized.234 On the other hand, if the state action doctrine was
bound by the guidelines of federalism, this type of conduct would
likely not be protected because it is not the state’s clearly articulated
policy that is being protected, but rather what the court thinks could
logically have resulted from the state’s policy. This immunity comes
at the expense of the consumer, who is subjected to the effects of
anticompetitive behavior—behavior that does not actually further the
policy of the Sherman Act or correspond to what the Court is aiming
to protect. Without the protection of antitrust law, there would be a

Sys., 663 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2011, cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4852 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
The Court will decide whether the clear articulation and active supervision requirements are met
in a case involving a local government entity, and it may provide some clarification to the
doctrine. See Matthew Bush, Petition of the Day, SCOTUSBLOG (May 4th, 2012, 11:43pm),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=144433.
228. See infra Part III.B.1–3.
229. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 358 (“The clear statement requirement is not
particularly rigorous.”).
230. Hettich, supra note 111, at 126.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 127.
234. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
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shortage of competitors to drive down prices, and, consequently, the
consumer would have to pay more for services.
Many cities have exclusive contracts with utilities or cable
companies that states do not expressly authorize but that courts
nonetheless protect because they consider it foreseeable that the city
would enter into these contracts when the state gives them the
authority to regulate in these areas.235 Thus, the consumers—the
residents of the city—ultimately pay more for utilities and television
than they would otherwise because there is nobody to compete with
the cable company or waste services provider and thus drive prices
down. For example, in Massengale, because the Court held that it
was foreseeable that the city would grant an exclusive contract for
waste disposal in the wake of a state statute that authorized cities to
manage their waste disposal, the plaintiff was required to pay for
trash and recycling services that he did not use.236 This change
resulted in an increase of the cost of waste disposal from about $1.56
per month to $15.65 per month.237
2. Active Supervision
The second prong of the Midcal test, the active supervision
requirement, is as problematic as the first prong. The requirement is
unclear and, with the exemption for municipalities, it is far too broad.
a. Unclear standard requires courts
to make subjective determination
about what is sufficient
Because it is unclear what is sufficient to satisfy this
requirement, it is difficult for private actors to determine whether
they are protected by antitrust immunity.238 This ambiguity unfairly
235. See, e.g., Massengale v. City of Jefferson, Mo., No. 10-CV-4232-NKL, 2011 WL
3320508, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2011); Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. Vill. of E. Hills, 320 F.3d 110
(2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 982 (2003) (upholding several municipalities’ grant of
monopoly over fire inspections to the New York Board of Fire Underwriters, because other
inspectors’ “complete exclusion from the market for required electrical inspection services [was]
a foreseeable result of a statute that require[d] municipalities to enforce a uniform fire code”).
236. Massengale, 2011 WL 3320508, at *1.
237. Id. at *1–3.
238. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 640 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(“Henceforth, a state-regulated public utility company must at its peril successfully divine which
of its countless and interrelated tariff provisions a federal court will ultimately consider ‘central’
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subjects those actors to antitrust liability when they happen to guess
wrong.239 Additionally, without clear standards, the reviewing court
will inevitably impose its own judgment about whether the economic
regulation in question is wise.240 Had the Court adhered to the
principles of federalism—instead of saying that antitrust law simply
did not apply in the context of state action—it would have developed
a standard that required accountability by the state rather than one
that requires courts to make determinations about the state’s
intention or the scope of the state’s authorization.241 Instead, the
standard defeats the purpose of the active supervision requirement,
which is to ensure that the private actor is engaging in conduct that is
deemed to be the conduct of the state itself.242
b. Misguided faith
in municipalities
Although the Supreme Court attempted to strengthen its
requirements for active supervision in Ticor and some circuits do use
a narrow definition,243 the Court exempted municipalities from the
active supervision requirement, thereby creating a wide open door to

or ‘imperative.’ If it guesses wrong, it may be subjected to treble damages as a penalty for its
compliance with state law.”); see also Hettich, supra note 111, at 138 (arguing that requiring
regulated parties to guess whether they will be protected by antitrust immunity is inherently
unfair).
239. Hettich, supra note 111, at 138.
240. Id.
241. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 54
(2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf. The Task Force
reported that “[t]hrough the active supervision requirement, the Court is furthering the
fundamental principal of ‘accountability’ that underlies federalism, by ensuring that, if allowing
anticompetitive conduct proves to be unpopular with a state’s citizens, the state’s legislators will
not be ‘insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decisions.’” Id. While the Task Force
Report correctly pinpoints the aims of the active supervision requirement, the doctrine currently
fails to further the principle of accountability. See infra Part III.B. The changes to the doctrine
suggested in this Article aim to achieve this.
242. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 53–54;
Hettich, supra note 111, at 136; McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 346.
243. See, e.g., Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2004) (“New
York has failed to provide for any state supervision, much less active supervision, [having] no
mechanism . . . whereby New York may review the reasonableness of the pricing decisions.”)
(quotations and citation omitted)); A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d
239, 258 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding insufficient active supervision for immunity because the
“States . . . lack oversight or authority over the tobacco manufacturers’ prices and production
levels,” which were decided “entirely [by] the private actors”).
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state action immunity.244 The Court reasoned that municipalities are
likely to act in the public interest and that there is little risk that a
municipality will become involved in private anticompetitive
conduct.245 However, the Court’s faith in municipalities has proven
naïve.246 Often, municipalities act in their own best interest,
implementing regulations that are harmful to the consumer.247 Since
there is no conspiracy exception to state action immunity, local
politicians acting for the municipality are free to enter into
agreements, which are harmful to the consumer and often arguably
corrupt, without the threat of liability.248 The Court’s decision in
Omni provides a striking example.249 There, the city council had to
show only that anticompetitive conduct was a foreseeable result of
the South Carolina statute that authorized municipalities to regulate
the construction of structures within its boundaries, a condition that
was “amply met.”250 Problems with the foreseeability standard aside,
the Court never even considered whether South Carolina had actively
supervised its grant of authority because the actor in Omni was a
municipality.251 The reason for this, though not stated in Omni itself,
is that the Court operated under the assumption that the municipality
was acting in the best interest of the public.252 Yet, in reality, the
majority owner of the billboard company was friends with many of
the city council members and was funding their campaigns.253 The
members of the city council, in protecting their friends at the
billboard company, were acting in their own best interest rather than
in the public interest.254 This type of self-interested behavior by

244. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
245. Id.
246. See William J. Martin, Comment, State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally
Supervised Parties, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1085 (2005).
247. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Active
Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Martin, supra note 246, at
1085 (“Despite Hallie's assurances to the contrary, municipal defendants sometimes threaten
competition as much as private parties.”).
248. See, e.g., Omni, 499 U.S. at 372.
249. Id. For facts see supra Part II.A.
250. Omni, 499 U.S. at 370–73.
251. Id. at 390–91.
252. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
253. Omni, 499 U.S. at 367.
254. See id. at 368.
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municipalities is not uncommon.255 Thus, the Court’s assurances in
Hallie appear to carry little weight, and exempting municipalities
from the active supervision requirement is actually very harmful to
the consumer.256
c. Exemption of regulatory agencies from
active supervision broadens state action
beyond its intended purpose
The Court’s exemption of municipalities from the active
supervision requirement also impacts its treatment of nonsovereign
subsidiaries of the state, such as regulatory boards, because courts
have not decided whether to treat these entities more like a private
actor or a municipality.257 Although the Court has addressed the
issue, it has not clearly determined which subdivisions of the state
should be regarded as sovereign state actors.258 Thus, it is not clear
whether the state must actively supervise these nonsovereign actors.
Further, the Court’s suggestions regarding how to treat the
agencies are troubling. Based on a footnote in Hallie, the Court
255. Just recently, in Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011), the
Seventh Circuit upheld a regulation enacted by several Illinois municipalities whereby a person in
need of a dumpster must use a specific company with which the municipality has an exclusive
contract. Id. at 885. The court itself recognized that “these contracts often have a financial benefit
for the municipality [and] also impose a cost on consumers who would prefer a different,
probably less expensive, trash hauler.” Id. However, because active supervision is not required,
and the court found that the anticompetitive consequences of an exclusive contract, which was
authorized by the state, were foreseeable, state action immunity applied, and the municipalities
were free to continue to act in their own best interest. Id. at 889.
256. See Martin, supra note 246, at 1085.
257. Compare Stratlenko v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty Hosp. Auth., No. 1:07-CV-258,
2009 WL 736007, at *24 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2009) (requiring that “the State exercise ultimate
control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct” before granting immunity to a hospital
authority’s peer review committee), with Shames v. Cal. Travel & Tourism Comm’n, 607 F.3d
611, 618–19 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d on rehearing en banc, 626 F.3d 1079 (holding that the
California Travel and Tourism Commission was exempt from the active supervision requirement
because it “possesse[d] enough of the qualities of a state agency.” The case was reversed and
remanded when the Ninth Circuit reheard it en banc, but there, the court found that California had
not authorized the anticompetitive conduct and did not address the active supervision issue.). See
also Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1575–76 (explaining that the Coucrt has not
determined how to treat nonsovereign subsidiaries); Hettich, supra note 111, at 117 (“[C]ase law
does not provide clear guidance with regard to the question of which subdivisions of the state
should be regarded as state actors.”); Hettich, supra note 111, at 134 (“There are no uniformly
applied or even clear criteria to determine the status of these entities.”).
258. Hettich, supra note 111, at 134 (“While case law is still clear that private actors are
subject to the supervision requirement, it is still unclear which hybrid or local entities are
exempted from supervision.”).
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seemingly would not require active supervision for state agencies,259
but state agencies often act more similarly to a private party than to a
state.260 If active state supervision is not required, these agencies are
essentially free to implement their own anticompetitive regulations
without the potential for liability.261 This expands Parker beyond its
goal of preserving state sovereignty and makes the immunity too
broad.262 This broadening of the doctrine frustrates antitrust
legislation and harms the consumer by allowing the agencies to
advance their own interests instead of the consumer’s.263 The Court
has even said that it is “obvious that the fact that . . . the conscious
desire on [a state agency’s] part may have been to benefit [private
parties] . . . cannot transmute [the agency’s] official actions into
those of a private organization.”264 Yet, if the goal of the state agency
is to protect private parties, why should the agency be afforded the
same leniency that municipalities are given?265 The purpose of the
state action doctrine is to allow states to implement their own
regulatory policies.266 Immunizing agencies that act on behalf of
259. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985); see supra II.B.1.
260. F.T.C. v. Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that state agencies may
engage in the same activities as a private party); see also Wash. State Elec. Contractors Ass’n v.
Forrest, 930 F.2d 736, 737 (9th Cir. 1991) (remanding the case for findings on active supervision
as well as a clearly articulated state policy after noting that the defendant rate-setting commission
had “both public and private members, and the private members [had] their own agenda which
may or may not be responsive to state labor policy”).
261. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1577–78 (arguing that active supervision for state
agencies should be required because state agencies enact so many anticompetitive regulations,
which they can usually find the authority for in state legislation, making a clear articulation
requirement insufficient on its own).
262. Elizabeth Trujillo, State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides with Deregulation:
Rehabilitating the Foreseeability Doctrine, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 349, 363 (2006)
(“The problem with the Midcal test has been that it does not necessarily advance the interests of
the state as Parker had originally intended for state action to do.”).
263. See id. (“[D]elegation to regulatory agencies allows for regulated entities such as public
utilities with close ties to the same entities regulating them to advance their own interests.”).
264. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411 n.41 (1978).
265. See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1595–96 (footnote omitted) (“Much
anticompetitive conduct is not the result of legislation, but rather emanates from regulatory
boards made up of decision makers who wear their regulatory hat at the board’s monthly
meetings, but earn a living in the very profession that they have been charged to regulate the other
353 days of the year. Given their financial self interest, there seems to be no principled reason to
consider these actors anything but private.”).
266. See Timothy J. Muris, Clarifying the State Action and Noerr Exemptions, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 443, 445 (2004) (“Parker stands for the proposition that the federal antitrust laws,
and the Sherman Act in particular, were not intended to restrict the lawmaking power of state
legislatures.”).
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private parties, rather than the state, does nothing to advance this
purpose. Further, while the immunized action may benefit some
private party, surely, if it is anticompetitive, it is at the expense of
another.267 Regulatory boards, such as state dental boards, state bar
associations, or state real estate boards “acting under the guise of
consumer protection” can implement anticompetitive regulations that
make it more difficult for others to practice in that area. 268 Courts
immunize this conduct if the agency can show that the state
authorized or foresaw this type of regulation.269 When this conduct is
immunized, there is no protection for those who would otherwise
claim that they were harmed by an antitrust violation, and the
regulatory agencies are free to act in their own best interest at the
expense of the consumer.
3. Market Participant Exception
Another area where the Court has created uncertainty within the
state action doctrine concerns whether there is a market participant
exception.270 In Omni, the Court held that there is a “possible market
participant exception”271 and that “[Parker] immunity does not
necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity
but as a commercial participant in a given market.”272 Courts have
been left to guess whether such an exception exists.273 The court in
Pennsylvania v. Susquehanna Area Regional Airport Authority274
noted this uncertainty, saying that the Court “has [not] clearly
articulated the parameters of the market participant exception.”275
The court also cited two Third Circuit cases, one holding that a
market participant exception does exist, and the other holding that it
267. See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1577–78.
268. Id. at 1577 n.99.
269. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985); see supra II.B.1.
270. See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1577–78.
271. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991) (emphasis
added).
272. Id. at 374–75 (emphasis added).
273. See Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc. v. Morgan Cnty., Ind., 397 F. Supp. 2d
1032, 1046 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (finding no authority or support for a market participant exception);
see also Pennsylvania v. Susquehanna Area Reg’l Airport Auth., 423 F. Supp. 2d 472, 482 (M.D.
Pa. 2006) (assuming a market participant exception exists, but holding that challenged activity
did not qualify as market participation).
274. 423 F. Supp. 2d 472.
275. Id. at 482 n.16.
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does not.276 The court “assume[d] recognition of the market
participant exception [until] further clarification from the Third
Circuit and Supreme Court” is given.277
Having no market participant exception, or an unclear exception,
makes it too easy for the state to abuse its protected regulatory power
and favor state-owned or state-affiliated enterprises.278 For example,
a municipality, without antitrust liability, could require solid waste to
be treated at a city-run facility, rather than at competing private
facilities.279 The municipality is not acting pursuant to a state policy
but is acting as a seller of waste services.280 If the purpose of the
state action doctrine is to preserve the principles of federalism and to
respect state sovereignty, the state’s decision to act as a market
participant should not be immunized. In that situation, the state is not
regulating private conduct but rather acting as a private party would
when it enters the market. Protecting a state when it is acting in this
capacity does nothing to further the principles of federalism.
Similarly, cities or agencies that purchase particular commodities use
their power “to reduce prices below the competitive level, to impose
terms and conditions on sellers, or to favor local businesses at the
expense of out-of-state companies.”281 Such conduct is an abuse of
the state’s regulatory power, and immunizing this type of state action
thwarts the goals of antitrust law by harming the consumer.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because the Noerr and state action doctrines are broader than is
justified by the principles that should shape them, the Court should
narrow the doctrines. It should do so by aligning the Noerr doctrine
with the First Amendment and aligning the state action doctrine with
the principles of federalism. Doing this will narrow the doctrines
sufficiently to preserve the goals of antitrust law, but it will also still

276. Id. (quoting A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 265 n.55 (3d
Cir. 2001) (recognizing exception) and Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2003) (no
market participant exception)).
277. Id.
278. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 151.
279. See Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 998 F.2d 1073, 1077 (1st Cir. 1993).
280. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 150.
281. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 17, at 320 (footnotes omitted).
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give deference to the underlying principles of the First Amendment
and federalism.
A. Narrowing Noerr and Bringing It Within
the Parameters of the First Amendment
The Court should narrow Noerr—first, by clearly defining what
a “petition” is, and second, by adopting limitations similar to those
already placed on the First Amendment, such as a fraud exception
and a strengthened sham exception.
1. The Court Should Clearly Define “Petition”
Because Noerr is based on the First Amendment right to
petition, the conduct that Noerr protects should align with the rights
that the First Amendment protects.282 However, since the Court has
not used First Amendment principles to define the scope of the
doctrine, the scope of protection under Noerr is currently broader
than is justified by the First Amendment.283 Thus, the Court should
first narrow the scope of Noerr by more narrowly defining what
constitutes a petition. Doing an analysis now to determine what is
and is not protected by the First Amendment right to petition will
inform where the boundaries of Noerr immunity should be drawn.
For this reason, the Court needs to evaluate what a “petition” is and
define the term more specifically, taking guidance from the kind of
petitioning activity the First Amendment protects.284 The Court
should start by looking at the First Amendment itself, which says,
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people
peaceably. . . to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”285 To qualify as a petition entitled to government
protection, the communication must be a request to the government
for some action.286 Thus, activity, such as filings with the

282. See id. at 381.
283. Id. at 300.
284. Id. at 301 (“The only reason for exempting petitioning activity is that the Constitution
takes precedence over the antitrust laws. It follows that when the First Amendment protections of
speech and petitioning are inapplicable, anticompetitive petitioning activity should be subject to
antitrust liability . . . .”).
285. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
286. Id.; E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961)
(describing a petition as “an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular
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government, that is not aimed at directly influencing the government
to take a particular action should not be immunized.287 The Court can
use this definition of petitioning as a framework to create boundaries
to Noerr immunity.
2. The Court Should Adopt
First Amendment Limitations
The right to petition is not absolute.288 The First Amendment
does not protect petitions that are based on fraud or
misrepresentation.289 The Court has stated, “[T]here is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”290 Nor does the First
Amendment protect petitions that are designed to harass an opponent
rather than obtain relief.291 Further, the right to petition and the right
to free speech—although distinct rights—are related and, as such, are
subject to the same constitutional analysis.292 Speech that is not
protected by the right to free speech is likewise not protected by the
petition clause.293 For example, petitions that “express damaging
falsehoods” are not protected speech according to libel law294 and

action with respect to a law”); see also Lao, supra note 65, at 1004 (giving different definitions
for petition).
287. See Lao, supra note 65, at 1007 (“The First Amendment Right of Petition mandates the
protection of citizens’ efforts to influence governmental action. If the nature of the filing is such
that it is primarily mechanical and does not attempt to persuade any official to do anything, it is
not a petition, and hence, does not implicate the right of petition.”). One area where this would
have a significant impact is in the regulation of brand-name drugs. A drug manufacturer that
wishes to sell a new brand-name drug is required to submit a listing identifying all patents. Id. at
993. This listing is filed in what is known as the Orange Book. Id. Where a drug company files an
Orange Book listing, the FDA engages in no review. Id. The company does not ask the FDA for
any particular action, yet it receives benefits from simply filing the listing. See id. at 994. Because
the drug company does not seek specific action from the FDA, this should not be considered a
petition, and Noerr immunity should not be given without even getting to the question of whether
an exception applies. Id. at 1005. This type of analysis would apply anywhere communication is
made with the government without the petitionary component. See id. at 1004–07.
288. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1985).
289. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
290. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
291. See Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[N]either the Petition
Clause nor the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects sham petitions, and statutes need not be
construed to permit them.”).
292. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n.11 (1985).
293. See McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
294. Id. at 484.
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therefore should not be protected by Noerr either.295 Even beyond
the well-known areas of the law where false statements are not
protected by the First Amendment, such as defamation, perjury, and
fraudulent solicitation of money, numerous federal laws restrict the
making of false statements.296 Thus, Noerr should not protect these
types of petitions.
a. The Court should create an exception for
fraud and intentional misrepresentations
Using these guidelines, the Court should implement a fraud and
misrepresentation exception to Noerr that is separate and distinct
from the sham exception. This exception should deny immunity to
petitioners that make intentional misrepresentations, and it should
apply in legislative and regulatory settings as well as in the
adjudicatory context. The Court should create a fraud exception
because “false speech does not advance any First Amendment
interests.”297 In order to protect legitimate speech, the Court has
offered some protection for false speech.298 This should hold true in
the Noerr context. It would be antithetical to First Amendment goals
to stifle petitions by imposing the fear of antitrust liability on
petitioners whose claims are based on information that is not entirely
true. Thus, only intentional misrepresentations should preclude a
petition from immunity.299 However, it is potentially very dangerous
to implement anticompetitive laws and regulations based on false
information.300 Lawmakers and adjudicators rely on the petitioner for
295. Lao, supra note 65, at 1008 (discussing McDonald and arguing that “[i]f the right of
petition is not absolute vis-à-vis libel because of that law’s competing interests, then neither
should it be absolute vis-à-vis antitrust enforcement for the same reason”).
296. See Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh & James Weinstein as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 2, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011) (No. 11-210), 2012 WL
6179424 (arguing that the Supreme Court should treat knowing falsehoods as an exception to
First Amendment protection, with some limited exceptions that would prevent a chilling effect on
true statements, and listing numerous examples of areas where the Court has upheld the
restriction of false speech).
297. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1606.
298. Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964)).
299. Some commentators have argued that this concern only applies to petitions in a
legislative setting, where people should be able to engage in open debate. See, e.g., Lao, supra
note 65, at 1009–10. In an adjudicatory setting, petitioners must already act in accordance with
the court or agency’s procedures. Id. Thus, the requirement that the misrepresentation be
intentional should only apply to petitions made in a legislative setting. Id.
300. See supra Part III.B.2.
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accurate information so that they can make the best-informed
decisions.301 If petitions based on false information are protected,
these governmental systems cannot function properly.302 Thus, the
same protection given to false speech in the First Amendment
context need not be given here. The only extra requirement should be
that the fraud or misrepresentation was intentional. Beyond that,
extra protections for false speech should not be required, because the
danger of these laws and regulations outweighs the danger of stifling
legitimate petitions.303
b. Intentional misrepresentations should
not be immunized in any context
The Court and many commentators suggest that any
misrepresentation exception should be limited to petitions in an
adjudicatory context.304 Some commentators cite evidentiary
concerns.305 Others, like the Court, suggest that misrepresentations
are inevitable and acceptable where lobbying is done in a political
context but are not acceptable inside the courts, which require
accuracy.306 However, as Part III.B.2 of this Article has discussed,
misrepresentations in the legislative setting can be equally as harmful
as those in an adjudicative setting.307 Therefore, the chilling effect of
sanctioning misrepresentations in a legislative setting can be

301. See Lao, supra note 65, at 1016 (arguing that this is not the case in legislative
proceedings where, because of the nature of lobbying, “some misrepresentations may be
inevitable”).
302. See id. at 1016–17.
303. Id. at 1024 (“While it is generally true that speech restraints may deter the free flow of
information to government, the type of petitioning that implicates anticompetitive concerns is
typically made by business interests with an economic stake in the subject matter of the petition.
It is reasonable to assume that their economic self-interest in the sought-after action would
counterbalance, to some extent, the fear of immunity loss and neutralize (or minimize) the
chilling effect.”).
304. See, e.g., Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1607; Lao, supra note 65, at 1016.
305. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1607.
306. Lao, supra note 65, at 1016.
307. See supra Part II.B. (discussing Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834,
843 (7th Cir. 2011), where a hospital presented false information about effects of a new health
center, and based on this information the Village Board denied approval for construction of the
new health center).
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adequately addressed by withholding Noerr protection only when the
misrepresentation is intentional.308
Additionally, the misrepresentation exception needs to be
separate from the sham exception because the purpose of the sham
exception is to keep out those who do not genuinely seek
governmental action.309 If the sham exception is the only exception,
petitioners who intentionally misrepresent their cause are not
necessarily precluded from immunity because their petition is
“genuine.”310 In fact, those employing fraud and misrepresentations
in their petitions do likely want to obtain a particular result;
otherwise, they would not need to lie. Furthermore, since a winning
lawsuit is by definition not a sham,311 a lawsuit won based on
misrepresentations would still be immune from liability.312 Thus,
misrepresentations cannot fall within in the sham exception.
3. Broadening Sham to Protect the Consumer
Finally, the sham exception needs to be broadened significantly.
First, the Court should clarify the objective part of the test and
specifically define what “objectively baseless” means. Using
probable cause and the language of Rule 11 as alternative definitions
is confusing because they have different meanings. 313 Additionally,
this language makes the requirement for proving a sham too

308. The District of Massachusetts recently made a similar argument in response to a claim
that the sham exception only applies in an adjudicatory capacity. In re Prograf Antitrust
Litigation, No. 1:11–md–2242-RWZ, 2012 WL 293850, at *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 1, 2012). The court
asserted that “if the sham exception applied only to adjudicative processes, then any act of
advocacy before a legislative or quasi-legislative body would be shrouded in carte blanche
immunity regardless of purpose or sufficiency—even if the activity was utterly baseless, an abuse
of process, and motivated solely to stifle competition. Such a result is inconsistent with the
reasoning underlying the doctrine espoused in Noerr and reiterated in subsequent Supreme Court
cases.” Id.
309. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972); E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
310. Lao, supra note 65, at 1021–22 (“Without a separate misrepresentation exception . . .
even litigation tainted with fraud and used as an anticompetitive tactic could be immunized under
the Noerr doctrine, on the theory that the purpose of the litigation (fraud-tainted or not) was to
obtain a successful judicial outcome and not merely to harass the competitor through the litigation
process itself.”).
311. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 n.5
(1993).
312. Lao, supra note 65, at 1022.
313. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
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narrow.314 “Objectively baseless” should therefore mean that there is
no reasonable expectation of success. This would help limit the
number of petitions that Noerr immunizes. While the test would be
strong enough to protect losing claims from automatically being
considered a sham,315 it would limit the exception by denying
immunity to those petitions that have probable cause but nonetheless
have no reasonable expectation of success. This would strengthen the
safeguard against claims that a petitioner intended to abuse the
consumer through the process of petitioning rather than the result of
the petition.
Second, the Court should eliminate the subjective part of the
test. Looking at whether the petition was objectively baseless serves
a similar function as the subjective part of the test in that it keeps out
those who petitioned for the purpose of abusing the process rather
than obtaining a favorable result.316 Likely, petitioners actually
seeking success on the merits will not bring an objectively baseless
lawsuit. However, the objective test does not create an easy way for
petitioners to retain immunity by showing that they wanted the result
of the petition, as the subjective part of the test does. Thus,
eliminating the subjective part of the test leaves an exception that is
able to achieve its purpose—to protect against baseless lawsuits
meant to harass opponents. Limiting the sham exception in this way
keeps out lawsuits that are not entitled to First Amendment
protection and that thus do not deserve immunity under Noerr.317
Further, the sham exception recognizes the importance of protecting
the petitioning process.318 While petitions are protected under the
current doctrine, they cannot be protected adequately and effectively
if people are able to abuse the system that hears and responds to
petitions.319 This is another reason to broaden the sham exception.320

314. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
315. The Court has been concerned with a backward-looking rule whereby courts make a
determination based on the knowledge that the petition has been unsuccessful. Prof’l Real Estate
Investors, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5.
316. Lao, supra note 65, at 1025 (“If a lawsuit is already shown to be objectively baseless, the
institution of suit itself implicitly shows a degree of lack of good faith; therefore, any further
requirement of proof of the litigant’s subjective intent in bringing the suit is redundant.”).
317. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2006); Lao, supra note 65, at 1026.
318. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1972).
319. Lao, supra note 65, at 1015–16.
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B. Narrowing the State Action Doctrine
and Aligning It with
the Principles of Federalism
State action immunity needs to be defined by the principles of
federalism. The Court has made it clear that it wants to be deferential
to the regulatory policies of the states, even where the Supremacy
Clause would permit preemption.321 However, if deference is the
goal, the Court should immunize state action that actually represents
“the substantive principles of governance expressed in the Court’s
respect for the role of the states in our federal system.”322 The
doctrine should be defined narrowly so that it immunizes only state
action that regulates domestic commerce, not policies implemented
for the benefit of private parties without state guidance or review.323
In order to do this, certain changes must be made to the doctrine.
1. Narrowing the Doctrine
by Strengthening the
Clear Articulation Standard
First, the Court must strengthen the clear articulation standard
by requiring more than foreseeability.324 In Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co.,325 the Court held that state action should be immunized from
320. Id. (“The need to protect government decision-making from corruption and abuse
militates against too narrow an interpretation of sham.”).
321. This reflects a general attitude of the Supreme Court toward state sovereignty in the last
few decades. See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 191–98
(2011). Justice Stevens criticizes the Rehnquist Court for its expansion of state sovereignty. Id.
Rehnquist operated under the assumption that “when a state acts as a state in the conduct of
governmental functions . . . the federal power is not supreme.” Id. at 192 (discussing Rehnquist’s
majority opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 823 (1976), which was later
overturned, but which, according to Stevens, shaped the way Rehnquist treated state sovereignty
in later cases). Stevens criticizes this view and the way that Rehnquist used it to expand the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. at 195.
322. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 299. In Justice Stevens’ view, the current view
of state sovereignty is far too broad. Id. He argues that “[d]epriving a state of the mysterious right
to protect its dignity from its own citizens is . . . necessary to protect the federal rights of those
citizens.” STEVENS, supra note 321, at 196. The current application of the state action doctrine
seems to comport with the Court’s broad grant of sovereignty to the fifty states. While this Article
proposes that the state action doctrine may be restricted in a way that does not conflict with the
principles of federalism, the Court may first have to narrow its broad view of state sovereignty
before it is willing to make these types changes.
323. See STEVENS, supra note 321, at 196.
324. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 51.
325. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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antitrust liability only to the extent necessary to make the state’s act
work.326 The Court should return to its holding in Cantor as a guide
to narrowing the doctrine. To determine whether anticompetitive
conduct comes within the purview of a state’s policy, courts should
inquire whether the state actually authorized the specific
anticompetitive conduct. In 2001, the FTC created a State Action
Task Force (the “Task Force”) to look into the state of the
doctrine.327 In 2003, the Task Force issued a report in which it
concluded that courts applied the doctrine in a way that threatened
competition, and it recommended a narrowing of the doctrine to
“help ensure that robust competition continues to protect
consumers.”328 With respect to the clear articulation standard, the
Task Force recommended, as does this Article, that courts find both
that the state authorized the specific conduct and that the state has
adopted a policy to displace competition in the manner at issue.329
This two-part test should mandate that the state actually intended the
anticompetitive result.330 Some scholars, even while arguing that the
clear articulation standard needs to be narrowed, have said that the
courts can still use the foreseeability standard to determine whether
the state’s policy to displace competition includes the conduct in
question as long they narrowly construe it to the specific conduct at
issue.331 However, it seems that the foreseeability standard is too
easy to stretch to the point that it no longer has any teeth, which
results in a return to the current state of the doctrine.332
Still, requiring the state to expressly point to which areas it
intends its policy to extend seems too burdensome. Thus, the Court
should create certain guidelines that could be used to determine
whether a state policy included the conduct at issue. Courts could
look at the legislative history of the policy, the actual language of the
statute, and other conduct that the state may expressly authorize.333

326. Id. at 596 n.34; see also Hettich, supra note 111, at 127 (discussing Cantor and clear
articulation standard).
327. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 51.
328. Id. at 1.
329. Id. at 51.
330. See id.
331. See Trujillo, supra note 262, at 356.
332. See supra Part B.1.
333. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 51 n.220.
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While this looks somewhat similar to the foreseeability standard, a
case-by-case analysis using set factors would ensure that courts take
a careful look at what the state’s policy authorizes, rather than just
concluding that the policy could foreseeably include the conduct at
issue. Additionally, requiring the state to expressly authorize the
conduct would eliminate state action immunity where the court finds
only a general regulatory scheme to displace competition rather than
authorization of the specific conduct.334 This approach narrows the
doctrine enough to protect consumers from anticompetitive conduct
where the state neither intended nor authorized the conduct.
However, the approach still protects the underlying goal of the state
action doctrine—that antitrust law is deferential to state regulatory
policy, as long as that policy is clearly articulated and specifically
intends to displace competition in the particular area at issue.
2. Narrowing the State Action Doctrine
by Strengthening the
Active Supervision Requirement
Second, the Court should create clear guidelines that strengthen
what is sufficient for active supervision. The ultimate purpose of the
active supervision requirement is to grant antitrust immunity to
private actors only when the private actor is engaging in conduct
deemed to be the conduct of the state itself.335 To start, the Court
should require the state to actually engage in some level of
supervision.336 Next, the Court should require that the actor show
that the state, not the private actor, is responsible for the
anticompetitive conduct. Some commentators have argued for a
sliding-scale approach, by which the Court would look at the entity
engaging in the anticompetitive conduct, and the conduct itself, to

334. See id. at 50–52.
335. See id. at 53–54.
336. This is what the court held in Ticor. F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 637–38
(1992). However, that case has been applied narrowly and only to very extreme situations,
because the court found that there was no supervision there at all. Id. at 638; see also Hettich,
supra note 111, at 137–38 (explaining that Ticor only clarified the active supervision requirement
for extreme cases); REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 37 (noting
that Ticor provided little if any specific guidance about what constitutes active supervision). Still,
this should be the starting point for all active supervision analyses.

1346

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1295

determine how strictly it should apply this standard.337 However,
such an approach would be hard to administer and would be very
similar to the existing test, where courts make subjective
determinations about what qualifies as sufficient supervision. Thus,
to determine whether the actor made a sufficient showing of
responsibility, courts should look at certain factors, including
whether the state
has ascertained the relevant facts, examined the substantive
merits of the private action, assessed whether the private
action comports with the underlying statutory criteria
established by the state legislature, and squarely ruled on
the merits of the private action in a way sufficient to
establish the challenged conduct as a product of deliberate
state intervention rather than private choice.338
Furthermore, the Court should reverse its holding in Hallie and
require active supervision for municipalities, using these same
guidelines. While the Court has held that municipalities
presumptively serve the public interest, it is clear that too often this
is not the case.339 Under the current doctrine, local politicians, acting
on behalf of municipalities, are able to conspire with constituents
who have something to offer them.340 This result undermines the
Court’s reasoning and suggests that state supervision of local
officials is necessary. Likewise, the Court should treat nonsovereign
subsidiaries of the state as private parties rather than state actors and
should require active supervision for these entities as well. One
option is for the courts to first determine whether the activities of the
regulatory board or other subdivision of the state are essentially that
of a private party by looking at “how the Board functions in practice,

337. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 147 (discussing a “tiered approach to determine
immunity, as favored by” John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action:
Evolving Views on the Proper Role of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075, 1089–90 (2005)).
338. REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 54. The Task Force also
recommended implementing procedural guidelines, which would require that the private actor
show that the state had developed a factual record, had made an assessment about how the private
action comported with these standards, and had put that in a written decision. Id. at 55.
339. See supra Part III.C.2.b.
340. See supra Parts III.B.1.c, III.C.2.b.
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and . . . the role played by its [private] members.”341 However, courts
could more easily administer a bright-line rule that requires active
supervision. Additionally, requiring the state to actively supervise the
municipalities and regulatory agencies that are implementing its
regulatory policies would ensure that these bodies were acting in
accordance with the state’s policies.342 While this may create extra
work for the states, it will incentivize them to think carefully about
the anticompetitive policies they wish to enact.343 If the state does
not want to implement its own policy, it will have to actively
supervise any party that does.344 This requirement creates a higher
bar for immunity. Additionally, it would “[]focus the inquiry on the
relevant question of whether in a given case there actually are
deliberate and intended state policies that would justify setting aside
national antitrust goals.”345 Further, this approach does not encroach
on the principles of federalism, because any policy that is actually
authorized and supervised by the state will still be protected.346
3. Implementing Market Participant
and Conspiracy Exceptions
Finally, the Court should implement market participant and
conspiracy exceptions to state action immunity. When a state
government enters the market to buy or sell goods in competition
with private firms, it acts as a market participant.347 When the state
creates a monopoly or acts in an otherwise anticompetitive way in
this capacity, it simply acts to exclude its own competition.348
Because the state is no different from any private actor in this
situation, in the sense that it is acting as any other buyer or seller of
goods rather than regulating the market, its anticompetitive conduct

341. F.T.C. v. Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 1987); see also REPORT OF THE STATE
ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 55 (listing “laundry list of factors” currently used to
determine whether the state must actively supervise a quasi-governmental entity).
342. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 54.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 52.
346. See id.
347. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 320.
348. Id.
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should not be immunized.349 There are already other areas of the law
where the Court has created an exception for states acting as a
market participant.350 For example, there is a market participant
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause.351 Action that
“constitute[s] a direct state participation in the market” is immune
from the Dormant Commerce Clause, but regulatory action is not.352
There is no reason why this exception should not extend to antitrust
cases as well.
The State Action Task Force recognized that “a state may elect
to allow market participation by municipalities.”353 However, this
just underscores the need for municipalities to be subject to the
active supervision requirement.354 Creating a market participant
exception, which would subject states and municipalities to antitrust
liability for acting anticompetitively, would protect those that the
state or municipality competes against.
Further, adding a conspiracy exception to Parker would
eliminate the opportunity for states to abuse their regulatory
immunity by entering into conspiracies with private parties.355
Because the current state of the doctrine fosters corruption within the
political system,356 a conspiracy exception is needed to prevent
corrupt agreements between state actors and individuals. A
conspiracy exception would also bolster the market participant

349. Hettich, supra note 111, at 150 (“There is no reason to treat states differently from
private actors if a state is becoming a participant in a private agreement or in a combination with
others to restrain trade.”).
350. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 477 U.S. 429 (1980) (recognizing the market participant
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause where state entered the market as a seller); Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (recognizing the market participant exception to
the Dormant Commerce Clause where the state entered market as a purchaser).
351. A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 265 n.55 (3d Cir. 2001).
352. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town
of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997) and New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277
(1988)).
353. REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 57.
354. See id. A municipality’s action as a market participant should not be immunized because
the municipality’s actions are likely in their own best interest rather than the public’s when they
act as a competitor in the market. Id.
355. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 151. Hettich argues that when the state enters the market
as a competitor, its role as a market participant creates a conflict of interest with its role as a
regulator. Id. Creating a conspiracy exception along with a market participant exception will close
the door on the states’ ability to abuse their regulatory power. Id.
356. See supra Parts III.B.1.c, III.C.2.b.
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exception by treating such conspiracies as private action rather than
state action.357 These exceptions would not take away from the
necessary deference required by federalism, because in this situation,
the state is acting as a private party and thus is owed no deference.358
V. CONCLUSION
Courts and scholars today recognize that the First Amendment
right to petition is the basis for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and
that federalism is the root of the state action doctrine.359 However,
these two doctrines have evolved far beyond what the First
Amendment and federalism require. This departure can be traced to
the Court’s holdings that petitioning and state action were
“essentially dissimilar” from what antitrust legislation was designed
to regulate. Contrary to the Court’s decisions, antitrust law is and
should be concerned with regulating petitioning and state action.360
The doctrines in their current states are immunizing anticompetitive
conduct that is very harmful to the consumer and that neither the
First Amendment nor the principles of federalism protect.
Consumers are left without the protection of antitrust law and end up
paying far more than they should for goods and services. While these
important constitutional protections deserve deference, the consumer
is being harmed in the name of that deference by doctrines that do
not align with what these principles require. Thus, the Court should
narrow the reach of Noerr and Parker. By acknowledging that these
doctrines concern constitutional protections and abandoning the
notion that the Sherman Act simply does not apply in these contexts,
the Court can use the First Amendment and federalism to define the

357. Hettich, supra note 111, at 151.
358. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 1 (“Because the
state action doctrine rests on principles of federalism, the doctrine shields sovereign activities of
the State itself.” (emphasis added)).
359. See, e.g., Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 841–42 (7th Cir.
2011) (explaining that the First Amendment protects the right of people to try to persuade the
government that monopoly is preferable to the policy of the Sherman Act); In re Flonase
Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 309 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (recognizing Noerr as a First
Amendment doctrine); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372 (1991)
(recognizing that Parker is designed to protect the interests of federalism).
360. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 293 (“[P]etitioning and state action present
precisely the sorts of problems with which the antitrust laws are concerned—exploitation of
consumers through the charging of supracompetitive prices.”).
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outer limits of Noerr and Parker. This will afford more protection to
the consumer and can be done without sacrificing the individual’s
right to petition or detracting from a state’s sovereignty.

